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LABOR ORGANIZATIONS IN LEGISLATION
D URING the first months of the current year, the Supreme Court
of the United States handed down three decisions on important
questions in labor legislation.' The Employers' Liability Act was
declared unconstitutional, but on grounds that may be avoided by
subsequent legislation; the boycott was decided to be an unlawful
conspiracy against interstate commerce, and in violation of the Anti-
Trust Act and the congressional enactment providing criminal pun-
ishment for the discharge of an employee because of his membership
in a labor organization was also held unconstitutional. These
decisions have been unjustly spoken of by some, as unreasonably
severe on labor organizations. The benefits that have come to
laborers through the labor unions are recognized by the Court, but
it is also pointed out that they can not secure their ends, however
desirable they may be, through unlawful means and cannot abridge
the constitutional personal rights of others through state or national
legislation.
The case of Loewe v. Lawlor, known as the Hatter's Case, in which
CHIEF JUSTIcE FULLr.R delivered the opinion of the court, is perhaps
the most important on the general subject. The decision has been
most bitterly criticized by persons of prominence in labor organi-
zations.
This was an action brought under Section 7 of the Anti-Trust
Act of July 2nd, i89o , claiming three-fold damages for injuries in-
flicted on the plaintiff by a combination or conspiracy declared to be
unlawful by the act. The opinion sets out the complaint in full.
It is a remarkable document in pleading, covering some 7000 words.
' Howard v. Illinois Central Railway, decided January 6, 1908, 207 U. S. 463, 28
Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Adair v. United States, decided January 26, 1908, 208 U. S. 161,
28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277; Loewe v. Lawlor, decided February 3, 1908, 208 U. S. 274, 28
Sup. Ct. Rep. 301.
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The wrong complained of is, in brief, that the defendants combined
collectively with the United Hatters of North America, acting under
The American Federation of Labor, of which the defendants were
members, to ruin plaintiffs' interstate business, by means of a boy-
cott against hats made at Danbury, Connecticut, and sold by plain-
tiffs throughout the United States. The boycott was declared
against plaintiffs to compel them to unionize their factory. The
complaint was demurred to and District JuDGE PLATT for the District
of Connecticut sustained the demurrer. It was conceded that the
complaint showed that by means of the boycott the defendants
sought to curtail and, if possible, to destroy, plaintiffs' production
of hats at home and the distribution of such product after it had be-
come settled into the stock of goods in the hands of the plaintiffs'
customers in other states. In sustaining the demurrer the District
judge gave as his reason: "There is no allegation which suggests
that the means of transporting plaintiffs' product or the product it-
self while being transported were touched, handled, obstructed, or
in any manner actually interfered with. There is no allegation that
the defendants are in any way engaged in interstate commerce."2
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment
of the lower court, holding that the boycott of plaintiffs' business
.was a common law wrong, in that: "At common law every person
has individually, and the public also have collectively, a right to
require that the course of trade should be kept free from unreason-
able obstruction; ' and that the facts set forth in the complaint
brought the case clearly under Section i of the Anti-Trust Law,
declaring: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal."
This decision holds, in effect, that the federation of labor is a
trust or an otherwise combination and that it cannot interfere with
freedom of commerce between the states by means of a boycott,
without rendering its officers and members who act for it, to that
end, liable in treble damages to the party injured. It will be noticed
that the same statute provides a punishment by fine and imprison-
ment for any person, who shall engage in any such combination or
conspiracy. This leaves the boycott without much efficiency. It
cannot be used against manufacturers of articles of interstate com-
merce, and is equally within the spirit and letter of state anti-trust
'148 Fed. R. 924.
SChief Justice Earl on Trade Unions, cited by Chief . ustice Fuller.
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legislation, in matters of domestic commerce. The decision is based
on principles announced in previous decisions of the court, 4 with
special reference to Swift v. United States,5 Aikens v. Wiscnsih.,
Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States,, and MontWague and
Co. v. Lowry.
7
These cases involved illegal combinations of capital, but the court
held that combinations of laborers in restraint of interstate trade
were as much under the condemnation of the statute as combinations
of manufacturers or tradesmen. The Court refers with approval to
the Debbs Case," also to the decision of District JUDGE BILLINGS in
the case involving the New Orleans strike of 1892, in which it was
held that a combination of laborers to effect a discontinuance of
labor in all departments of business, including transportation of
goods from state to state, was a combination in restraint of inter-
-state commerce, and the fact that the restraint affected state com-
merce as well did not render the acts lawful or any the less against
interstate trade. The supreme court did not regard the objections
to the complaint sustained by the lower court as tenable, and held
that there was set forth an illegal combination in restraint of inter-
state commerce, even though it appeared, "That the restraint alleged
would operate to entirely destroy defendants' business and thereby
included intrastate trade as well; that physical obstruction is not
alleged as. contemplated; and that defendants are not themselves
engaged in interstate trade." The fact that the several acts com-
plained of were of themselves innocent acts was relied upon as a
defense, but the court quoted in answer to this from the opinion
of JUSTIcE HOLMES in the Aikens Case (supra). "Every plot is an
act in itself. * * * The most innocently and constitutionally pro-
tected of acts or omissions may be made a step in a criminal plot,
and, if it is a step in that plot, neither its innocence nor its consti-
tutionality is sufficient to prevent a punishment of the plot by law."
The boycott and the "sympathetic strike" have for years been most
effective in securing favorable action on the demands of organized
labor. The decision of the court in the Hatter's case is clearly to
the effect that both these agencies work a common law wrong and
where they interfere with interstate commerce are, as generally
conducted, in violation of the Anti-Trust Act. Upon this question
4United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso., 166 U. S. 290; United States v.
Joint Traffic Asso., 171 U. S. 505; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S.
197.1 196 U. S. 395.
195 U. S. 194.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States 175 T S. 217; Montague & Co. v.
Lowry, 193 U. S. 38.
8158 U. S. 564.
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there is some conflict in the decisions of the state courts, settled by
the decision in this case so far as this question is involved.
It is now proposed to amend the act, by excepting from its oper-
ation combinations of farmers and laborers. Such an amendment
would give rise to some serious constitutional questions. Congress
may by such an exception deprive persons of the specific remedies
called for in the act, but that would not deprive courts of law and
equity of the power to grant relief as against a tortious act inflicting
damage upon a person's property-right in interstate trade. More-
over, can Congress legalize a combination of capitalists, farmers or
laborers to the extent of giving them the power of practically pro-
hibiting commerce between the states, through the boycott or any
other agency? Congress is given the power to regulate, but" not the
power to prohibit, the lawful interchange of articles of commerce
between the several states. Such an exception to the act is suggested
without due consideration of the judicial power of the courts under
the constitution and th4 intent and meaning of the commerce clause
and the property-rights clauses of the same instrument. To this
decision of the court no dissenting opinion seems to have been
handed down.
The case of William Adair v. United States, decided the same
term, gave the court more trouble.
William Adair, a master mechanic and employer of the Louis-
ville and Nashville Railroad Company, common carrier of interstate
commerce, discharged from the employ of the company one Coppage
by reason of his membership in a labor organization, known as the
Order of Locomotive Firemen. Adair was indicted in the District
Court of the United States for the eastern district of Kentucky and
charged with having unjustly discriminated against Coppage, an
employee of a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce, by
reason of his membership in a labor organization; in violation of
Section io of the Act of Congress of June I, 1898, "concerning
carriers engaged in interstate commerce and their employees." This
section makes it a crime to unjustly discriminate against any em-
ployee of an interstate carrier, because of his being a member of a
labor organization. Defendant Adair demurred to the indictment.
The facts charged in the indictment brought the case clearly within
the terms of the statute and the questions on the demurrer involved
the constitutional power of Congress to punish criminally an em-
ployer engaged in interstate commerce, for discharging an employee
in violation of this section, when the contract of employment was
for an indefinite period'and terminable at any time at the will of
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either party. District JUDGE COCHRAN held that Section iO of this
act was constitutional; that it did not violate the 5th Amendment of
the Federal Constitution, providing that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law: that it was
a reasonable regulation under the interstate commerce clause, sub-
ject to which liberty of contract was guaranteed; that while a con-
tract of service between an employer engaged in interstate commerce
and his employee was not strictly within the letter of interstate
commerce it was an adjunct or incident of such commerce and there-
fore a proper subject of congressional regulation; and further, that
while the act might be objectionable, on grounds of policy as class
legislation, yet there was no provision in the constitution prohibiting
Congress from passing laws subject to such objection, that the pro-
vision against class legislation applied only to state action. The
demurrer was overruled and defendant was convicted, and the case
was brought for review before the supreme court of the United
States.
MR. JUSTIcE HARLAN writing for the Court held that Section Io
-of this act was void for the reason that it deprived the defendant of
his liberty of contract guaranteed by the 5th Amendment of the
United States Constitution. JUSTCE S MCKENNA and HoLrEs dis-
sented.
The act of 1898 was an outgrowth of the Chicago strike of 1894,
and the general purpose of the act was to provide for the voluntary
arbitration of labor disputes between carriers and employees en-
gaged in interstate commerce. In this way it was thought that the
dangers to interstate commerce arising from strikes, boycotts and
lockouts might be avoided. When the bill was up for consideration
before the senate the committee on education in its report said of the
bill, "The necessity for the bill arises from the calamitous results
in the way of ill-considered strikes arising from the tyranny of
capital or the unjust demands of labor organizations, whereby the
business of the country is brought to a standstill and thousands of
employees with their helpless wives and children are confronted with
starvation." Section 1o was included in the act on the theory that
it would be helpful to its general purpose, but just how is not quite
clear. This much is certain, it gave to "union" men protection not
accorded to "non-union" men and was in that respect a piece of
class legislation not generally regarded with favor. In his opinion
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN says: "It may be observed in passing that
while this section makes it a crime against the United States to un-
justly discriminate against an employee of an interstate carrier be-
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
cause of his being a member of a labor organization, it does not
make it a crime to unjustly discriminate against an employee of a
carrier because of his not being a member of such an organization."
Before the passage of this act the substance of section Io had been
incorporated in the statutes of several states, providing for criminal
punishment of an employer who discharged an employee by reason
of his membership in any labor organization, or who exacted as a
condition of employment that the employee should not become a
member of any labor union. The state courts have quite uniformly
held such statutes to be unconstitutional in that they violated both
the federal and state constitutional guarantees of personal liberty
and private property.'
In State v. Ketzenberger,1 the defendant had been arrested upon
a complaint charging him with having unlawfully discharged an
employee because said employee was a member of a labor organi-
zation. The complaint and warrant were under a fairly typical
statute."
The case came before the supreme court of Wisconsin on a return
to'a writ of habeas corpus sued out by the defendant. The court
held, in a very exhaustive opinion, by DODGE J., that the law was
not a valid exercise of police power but an unwarranted interference
with freedom in making contracts and an infringement of the right
to "liberty and the pursuit of happiness" guaranteed by state and
federal constitutions. The decision is based on the fundamental
doctrine that, "It is a part of every man's civil rights that he be left
at liberty to refuse business relations with any person whomsoever
whether the refusal rests upon reason, or, as the result of whim,
caprice, prejudice, or malice." 12  Limitations on this right to the
police power of the state are distinctly pointed out, but it is held that
the statute is not a proper exercise of the police power for the
reason that "It does not in terms or by implication promote, or
pretend to promote the public health, welfare, comfort or safety."
In People v. Marcu*s,u the defendant was convicted of violating
a similar statute. He had required as a condition of employment
that the employee sign a written agreement containing this clause:
"State v. Katzenberger, 114 Wis. 530; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163; Gillespie v.
People 188 Ill. 176; People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257.
1 114 Wis. 530 (1902).
"The Wisconsin statute of 1899 provided that, "No person, corporation, agent or
officer on behalf of any person or corporation, shall force or compel any person or
persons into an agreement either *ritten or verbal, not to join or become a member of
any labor organization, as a condition of such person or persons securing employment,
or continuing in the employment of any such person or corportion, and no person or
corporation shall discharge an employee because le is a member of any labor organization."
A heavy fine was imposed for violation of this statute.
12 Cooley's Torts, p. 278.
Is 185 N. Y. 257.
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"Party of the second part hereby agrees not to belong to any
labor unions or to take part in any strike against the party of the
first part and to work as an individual in the open shop of party
of the first part." This act was in open violation of the statute,
but the New York Court of Appeals set the conviction aside for the
,reason that the law was unconstitutional. The court said in its
conclusion that, "the freedom of contract which entitles an employer
to make by agreement his place of business wholly within the control
of a labor union (Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207), entitles him, if
hc so desires, to require of his employees that they be wholly inde-
pendent of any labor union ;" and that, "he cannot be deprived of
this right by legislation."
In the Adair Case, DISTRICT JUDG4 CocHRAN called attention to
these decisions of the state courts, but held that they did not apply to
the case before him for that, in those cases, the legislation in ques-
tion was being enforced against persons engaged in private business
and not against persons engaged in interstate conimerce or in the
employ of public service corporations. This distinction is regarded
as .controling by JUSTICE MCKENNA. In his dissenting opinion in
the Adair Case, he says: "I would not be misunderstood. I grant
that there are rights which can have no material measure. There
are rights which, when exercised in a private business, may not be
disturbed or limited. With them we are not concerned, we are
dealing with rights exercised in a quasi-public business and there-
fore, subject to control in the interest of the public."
After reviewing recent decisions of the court on liberty of con-
tract, JUsTICE HARLAN wrote, on the main question before the
court: "It was the legal right of the defendant Adair-however
unwise such a course might have been-to discharge Coppage
because of his being a member of a labor organization, it was the
legal right of Coppage, if he saw fit to do so,---however unwise
such a course on his part might have been-to quit the service in
which he was engaged, because the defendant employed some per-
sons who are not members of a labor organization. In all-such
particulars the employer and employee have equality of rights, and
any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interfer-
ence with liberty of contract which no government can legally
justify in a free land." The opinion is based largely on the princi-
ples announced in Lochner v. New York. 4 When the decision in
the Lochner Case was handed down it was regarded as one of
great sig-nificance, greater perhaps than that of any case for many
24198 U. S. 45, 53, 56.
25People v. Lochner, 177 N. Y. 145.
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years past. The court of last resort in New York' 5 had, by a divided
court, sustained the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting con-
tracts for more than ten hours labor per day in a bakery, and the
Supreme Court of the United States by a divided court reversed
the decision on the ground that the statute was in violation of the
i 4 th amendhent to the United States Constitution. Some learned
writers on constitutional questions criticized this decision, as not
being in harmony with the previous decisions of the Supreme Court,
particularly the case of Holden v. Hardy, wherein it was said:
"the constitution of the United States * * * should not be so con-
strued as to deprive the states of their power to amend their
laws so as to make them conform to the wishes of the citizens as
they may deem best for the public welfare without bringing them
into conflict with the supreme law of the land."'1
6 It was contended
by some that the Lochner decision placed matters of purely domestic
concern, heretofore supposed to be under state control, under super-
vision of the federal judiciary. Prof. Freund in commenting on it
wrote: "A decision which reads into the i4th amendment a vague
and controverted conception of the liberty of contract is a novel
and hardly a fortunate step in the development of our constitu-
tional law."' 7 Others looked upon the decision in the Lochner Case
much more favorably and regarded it as giving to the 14th Amend-
ment a construction of pfonounced value to the individual; that
under it he was guaranteed against any unreasonable restraint or
abridgement of his personal and property contract rights by the
action of state legislatures, induced by the vote-getting power of
voluntary organizations of labor or capital. The writer's personal
views of this decision have heretofore been expressed." It was
feared, however, that a decision by a court, so evenly divided, might
not stand long and might soon go the way of other "cases distin-
guished." The Adair Case removes all apprehension, and it is
worthy of note that the prevailing opinion in this case is written
by Mr. JusMic4 HARLAN who wrote the leading dissenting opinion
in the Lochner Case. He points out that in the latter case, the
difference of opinion among the members of the court arose over
the question as to whether labor in a bakery is so unhealthful as
to call for limitation on the hours of labor therein through the,
police regulation, and as to whether in cases of doubt the determina-
tion should be left to the individual states. Upon the fundamental
question JUsTIcE HARLAN referring to the Lochner Case wrote:
16Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366.
TThe Green Bag Vol. 17 p. 4.14.
Is 3 Mich. Law Rev. 617.
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"Although there was a difference of opinion in that case among the
members of the court as to certain propositions, there was no dis-
agreement as to the general proposition that there was a liberty
of contract which cannot be unreasonably interfered with by
,legislation."
The most serious question before the Court in the Adair Case
arose out of a difference of opinion among the members of the court
as to whether the statute in question could be regarded in any sense
as a regulation of interstate commerce. JusTIcEs McKENNA and
HoLMEs in their dissenting opinions, reached the affirmative of that
proposition on the ground that the power of regulation extended to
the persons engaged in interstate commerce and that the statute in
question is a proper exercise of that power. Many decisions are re-
ferred to in support of this view, following Gibbons v. Ogden,'9 in
which Mr. JUSTIcE JOHNSON said, "Commerce in its simplest signi-
fication, means an exchange of goods, but in the advancement of
society, labor, transportation, intelligence, care and various means of
exchange become commodities and enter into commerce; the sub-
ject, the vehicle, the agent and their various operations become the
object of commercial regulations."
An examination of those cases discloses, however, that the deci-
sions referred to involved simply the supreme federal power in police
regulation over matters subject to congressional action under the con-
stitution and did not in any sense involve contractual rights of the
individual. The Northern Securities Case"' and Joint Traffic Asso-
ciation Case" relied on in the dissenting opinions involved proceed-
ings against corporations to have them declared illegal combinations
in violation of the Anti-Trust Act.
Without recognizing the bearing of those cases on the question
in the Adair Case, Mr. JusTicE HARLAN, speaking for the court, ob-
jects to the legislation under consideration on the ground that it has
no proper relation to interstate commerce. He wrote: "Manifestly,
any rule prescribed for the conduct of interstate commerce, in order
to be within the competency of Congress, under its power to regulate
"commerce among the states, must have some real or substantial
relation to or connection with commerce regulation. But what
possible legal or logical connection is there between an employee's
membership in a labor organization and a carrying on of interstate
,commerce? That relation to a labor organization cannot have, in
9 9 Wheat. 1.
20 193 U. S. 200.
= 171 U. S. 571.
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itself and in the eye of the law, any bearing upon the commerce
with which the employee is connected by his labor and service."
This is the precise question and the only one involved of practical
value. Can labor organizations through the sanction of state or
federal legislation deprive the individual of liberty of contract on the
ground that labor unions are so conducive to the public welfare that
the police power of the state may be exercised in their promotion
at the expense of individual freedom. The dissenting *opinion of
JusTIcE HOLMES inclines to the affirmative of this question. He
writes, speaking of Section IO of this statute: "But suppose the only
effect really were to tend to bring about complete unionizing of
such railroad laborers as Congress can deal with, I think that object
alone would justify the act. I quite agree that the question what
and how much good the labor unions do, is one on which intelligent
people may differ,--I think that laboring men sometimes attribute to
them advantages, as many attribute to combinations of capital dis-
advantages that really are due to economic conditions of a far
wider and deeper kind,-but I could not pronounce it unwarranted
if Congress should decide that to foster such unions ,was for the best
interest, not only of the men, but of the railroads and the country at
large."
This is not a new but is a somewhat alarming doctrine. The
state and national constitutional guarantees ought to rest, through
judicial construction, on a firmer and more definite basis than any,
legislative notion as to the right of conflicting industrial economic
theories.
Conceding, if one cares to, that the legislation in question has
sufficiently direct relation to interstate commerce, this does not
amount to a concession of its constitutionality. The commerce clause
and the personal rights clause of the constitution must be con-
strued together. One is a grant of power and the other is a limita-
tion on the -power of Congress. The grant should not be so liberally
extended as to impair unnecessarily the limitation. "The power to
regulate commerce has no limitations other than those prescribed in
the constitution. Power, however, does not carry with it the right
to destroy or impair those limitations and guarantees which are
also placed in the constitution or in any of the amendments to that
instrument. Mon1ongahcla Navigaion Company v. United States,
148 U. S. 312; Interstate Cannmerce Comminssion v. Brinison, 154
U. S. 447." 22 One of the limitations and guarantees included in that
instrument is the guarantee of liberty of contract. This is, of course,
171 U. S. 571.
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subject to the police power of regulation for the protection of the
public health, public safety, or public service, but what relation is
there between any one of these and membership in a labor organiza-
tion? JusTiCe McKENNA, writing ifi dissent, calls attention to the
fact that the action in question was passed in hope that it would
reduce to the minimum labor strikes which affect interstate com-
merce, he speaks of it as, "A provision of law which shall prevent
or tend to prevent the stoppage of every wheel in every car in an
entire railroad system engaged in interstate commerce." Ought
the government to yield to the demands of any class of persons
through fear that, unless its demands are complied with, it will
through illegal or violent measures impair freedom of commerce?
Must the government consent to the unionizing of labor, at the ex-
pense of constitutional guarantees, in order that public safety may
be conserved from violence and disorder? Upon this view of the
subject JusTIcE HARLAN wrote: "Will it be said that the provision
in question had its origin in the apprehension, on the part of Con-
gress, that if it did not show more consideration for members of
labor organizations that for all of them or any who were not mem-
bers of such organizations, or if it did not insert in the statute some
such provision here in question, members of labor organizations
would, by illegal or violent measures, interrupt or impair freedom of
commerce among the states? We will not indulge in any such
conjectures, nor make them, in whole or in part, the basis of our
decision. We cannot do so consistently with the respect due to a
coordinate department of the government."
The action of Congress in relation to car couplers on cars used
in interstate commerce, in relation to pilots engaged in marine
navigation, etc.,n and the action of state legislatures in relation to
the qualifications of engineers of locomotives through their technical
knowledge," or their disqualification through physical infirmity,
such as color blindness,'a all to be determined by bodies provided for
under competent authority, have been sustained as a proper exer-
cise of the police power of the state and for the public safety, but
what relation is there between the public safety and membership in
a labor union? None whatever, unless we can say that the union,
a voluntary organization, not even a legal entity, and without per-
sonal responsibility to the government, will resort to violent meas-
ures dangerous to life and property and must therefore be recog-
3 Johnson v. Railroad 196 U. S. 1.
SCooley v. Board of Wardens 12 How. 299.
5 Smith v. Alabama 124 U. S. 465.
2. Nashville Railway v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96.
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nized and conciliated. Such a concession to any voluntary organiza-
tion of labor or capital would be dangerous. Fear of violence and
disobedience to law should not be recognized. Violence is an evil
to be avoided and overcome, but not to be feared by the law-making
power, and the individual personal right of contract ought not to be
sacrificed in a compromise between lawlessness and governmental
power.
Danger of violence and interruption of intrastate commerce
through strikes of labor organizations are as pressing and of more
frequent occurrence than in interstate commerce, but the state
courts, as the cases referred to show, have quite uniformly held that
these dangers do not justify interference with the personal liberty
of contract by state legislation. Has Congress a greater power of
control 'in matters of interstate commerce than has the state over
matters of intrastate commerce? Cases may arise calling for an
affirmative answer to these questions, but membership in a labor
organization does not present such a case. The principle of limita-
tion on state action expressed in the 14th Amendment and the
limitation on federal action in relation to the same matter, expressed
in the 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States should
be construed in the same manner and given the same force and
effect. The grant of power in Congress over interstate commerce
should not be regarded as more extensive than the reserve power in
the state over intrastate commerce. It is fortunate in the direction
of settling of personal and property rights, that upon the main
question, the federal and state courts are agreed, that legislation
of the kind in question is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has left some questions arising out of the
Adair Case undetermined. The District Judge held that, while the
statute under consideration might be regarded as objectionable class
legislation, yet that there is no constitutional objection to class legis-
lation by Congress and therefore the statute could not be regarded
as unconstitutional on that ground. For obvious reasons the final
determination of the case rendered unnecessary any consideration of
this question; but the pointed allusion in the prevailing opinion of
the Supreme Court to the fact that the act discriminates between
union and non-union men suggests a serious doubt as-to whether the
court will ever hold that Congress has the power to make a person's
full enjoyment of his constitutional guarantees dependent upon his
becoming a member of any organization whatsoever. It should be
remembered that these guarantees are not for classes but for the
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individual, and the right guaranteed to him cannot be impaired under
the guise of class legislation.
In the opinion of the Court is this statement: "Without stopping
to consider what would have been the right of the railroad company
under the 5th Amendment, had it been indicted under the act of Con-
gress, it is sufficient in this case to say that, as agent of the railroad'
company and as such responsible for the conduct of the business
of one of its departments, it was the defendant Adair's right-and
that right inherent in his personal liberty, and so also a right of
property-to serve his employer as best he could, so long as he did
nothing that was reasonably prohibited by law as injurious to the
public interest." This leaves open the question of constitutional ob-
jections to the statute as applied to the railroad company. If it be
the right of the defendant Adair to prescribe the terms upon which
the services of Coppage would be accepted are his rights greater
than those of the company, his employer? Can a servant have
greater rights in the performance of his master's business than the
master? New conditions may call for new laws, but it is doubtful
whether it will ever be safe to allow an employee greater freedom
in the management of his employer's business than the employer
himself has. That a quasi-public corporation has not the same
rights under the constitution as a natural person has been long
conceded. In the Northern Securities Cose," it was held that: "a
corporation while by fiction of law recognized for some purposes as
a person and for purposes of jurisdiction as a citizen, is not endowed
with the inalienable rights of the natural person, but it is an artifi-
cial person, created and existing only for the convenient transaction
of business." The question, however, is, has not such a corporation
the same personal and property rights of contract in the employ-
ment of its agents and employees as a private corporation or a
natural- person?
The regulations which labor unions have adopted or may adopt
for the government of their members and the conditions which con-
front the employer are set forth by DODG4, J., in the Wisconsin Case
(supra). "The success in life of the employer depends on the
efficiency, fidelity and loyalty of his employees. Without enlarging
upon or debating the relative advantages or disadvantages of the
labor union, either to its members or to the community at large, it
is axiomatic that an employer cannot have undivided fidelity, loy-
alty, and devotion to his interests from an employee who has given
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to an association right to control his conduct. He may by its deci-
sions be required to limit the amount of his daily product. He may
be restrained from teaching his art to others. He may be forbidden
to work in association with other men whose service the employer
desires. He may not be at liberty to work with such machines or
upon such materials or products as the employer deems essential to
his success. In all these respects he may be disabled from the full
degree of usefulness attributable to the same abilities in another who
had not yielded up to an association any right to restrain his free-
dom of will and exertion. in his employer's behalf according to the
latter's wishes. Such considerations the employer has a right to
deem valid reasons for preferring not to jeopardize his success by
employing members of organizations. A 'man who has by agreement
or otherwise shackled ony of his faculties--even his freedom of
will-may well be considered less useful or less desirable by some
employers than if free and untramelled. Whether the workman can
find in his membership in such organizations advantages and com-
pensations to offset his lessened desirability in the industrial market
is a question each must decide for himself."
Can Congress punish, through indictment, an interstate carrier,
who declines to employ or refuses to retain in his employ a person
who, by becoming a member-of a labor union, agrees to be bound
by such or like regulations, while in his employer's business? If it
can, then it must be because a public service corporation has, under
the Constitution, very little of personal or property right of con-
tract, guaranteed as against legislative violation.
It should be noted that the contract involved calls for services of
a decidedly personal character requiring, in many cases, the utmost
good faith on the part of both parties to the contract. Courts of law
have long recognized this feature of personal service contracts and
for that reason have sustained the right of either party to sever the
contractual relation at will, giving only a remedy in damages, in case
of breach of contract for a definite period, and courts of equity have
uniformly declined to decree specific performance of such a con-
tract. We are inclined to the view that the right to sever the re-
lation, in a personal service contract, is a substantial right, which
cannot be taken away by arbitrary legislation and the exercise of it
cannot be made dependent on the fact that the c6ntract does 6r does
not call for a definite term of service. A decided disagreement for
whatever cause between the employer and employee renders the
contihuance of the relation intolerable'for both and, in public service
corporations, such disagreement sometimes brings inconvenience
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and danger to the public. The right to terminate this personal re-
lation is a substantial property right of which a public service cor-
poration cannot be deprived except under the police power of the
state and it is hoped that this extraordinary power will not be used
to force the unionizing of labor and to crush out individualism on
the theory that public safety demands such a concession; or on a
supposed inability on the part of the government to suppress or-
ganized violence in behalf of -labor or capital. There is no such in-
herent weakness in our government and there should not be on
such a theory any sacrifice of the substantial property rights guaran-
teed by the constitution.
Without further consideration of mooted questions We note that
the Adair case and the Hatter's case suggest:
Ist. That the boycott and sympathetic strike are agencies in
business that 'cannot be employed without meeting the severe con-
demnation of courts; that the use of them is against common right
and courts have the power to prevent or redress the wrong they
inflict.
2nd. The decisions are a pronounced recognition of individu-
alism. During the past twenty-five years there has been a mad rush
for organization and the rights of the individual have been trampled
upon and then conceded, only on condition that he become a member
of some organization of capital or labor, and both of these factors
have been equally at fault in this direction. The decisions plainly
indicate that the constitutional guarantees are for the individual as
against classes and organizations incorporated or unincorporated,
tlat individualism is to have a reasonable opportunity and is not to
be crushed out through the power of organization in the use of
questionable means and measures, or through legislative limitations
on freedom of action.
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